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NOTES AND COMMENTS

CORPORATE DEBT FINANCING UNDER THE TAX LAW
I-INTRODUCTION

The number of sole proprietorships and partnerships that are taking on the
corporate form is steadily increasing. One of the reasons for incorporating is the
tax savings available to corporations under the Federal Income Tax laws. However many corporations overlook the tax savings available to them through proper
financing, namely debt financing. Other corporations, while not overlooking the
use of debentures in financing, are unaware of the fatal tax consequences that
can result from the improper use of debentures. The attorney called upon to advise a business about to incorporate should be aware of the advantages and pitfalls of debt financing so that he may make available to it tax savings that will
not be later disallowed by the tax commissioner. This paper attempts to point
out the advantages of debt financing, and how to avoid the pitfalls which may
result in loss of tax savings.
II-THE

ADVANTAGES

OF DEBENTURES

Since interest is deductible while dividends are not, there is an obvious tax
incentive to having a corporation issue evidences of indebtedness as well as stock
for the cash or property transferred to it by its stockholders. In addition, certain
personal tax advantages will accrue to the organizers of the corporation, if they
become creditors as well as stockholders of the corporation. If the corporation
prospers, it may pay off its debt and the creditor-stockholders will realize income
only to the extent that the payment exceeds the adjusted basis of the instruments
paid off. The income, if any, will be capital gain under Section 1232 of the Internal Revenue Code. If the organizers hold only stock, however, the entire amount
of any payment by the corporation, including a pro rata reacquisition of stock,
would probably be taxed as a dividend, i.e., as ordinary income. On the other
hand, if the corporation should fail, the creditor-stockholder has at least a fighting
chance to write off his loss on the worthless debt against ordinary income. Such
a deduction will be permissible if Sections 166 (d) and (e) are not applicable,
i.e., if the debt is not evidenced by a "security" and if it is not a "nonbusiness
bad debt". Loss on worthless stock, however, must be treated as a capital loss,
Section 165 (g), unless Section 165 (g) (3) is applicable.
Because of these advantages many corporations are financed with a greater
portion of securities than stock. Or a corporation may even be organized so as
to fall without the nonrecognition rule of Section 351 in order that it may issue
interest bearing instruments other than securities or so it may acquire a stepped-up
basis on transferred property that has increased in value above its adjusted basis.
Whenever a closely held corporation is financed in such a manner by its share-
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holders there seems to arise a suspicion that the corporation and its shareholders
are not entitled to these advantages.
An excellent example of the tax advantages of debt financing1 is contained
-in the Harvard Law Review. 2 In brief the example presented is the incorporation
of a business with a net worth of $300,000 and $400,000 worth of gross assets,
which is netting $50,000 yearly after a reasonable allowance for owners' services.
On incorporation it is determined that the corporation needs $300,000 in gross
assets to operate. So at this point the corporation is "thinned". $100,000 is withheld in cash, reducing net worth to $200,000. The remaining $200,000 net worth
is divided into $150,000 worth of 15 year 6% bonds and $50,000 capital stock.
Assuming the corporation continues to net $50,000 annually, in about 7-8 years
the corporation will realize approximately $250,000 after taxes. Assuming assets
and liabilities to have remained about the same this $250,000 will be reflected
by an. increase in cash. Now the corporation can redeem the $150,000 of outstanding bonds and leave the remaining $100,000 in the corporation. This places
the business in substantially the same position as before incorporation and before
the $100,000 was withheld upon incorporation. As a result of these events the
stockholders have withdrawn from the 'business $250,000 entirely free from
income .taxes to themselves, and the corporation may have postponed tax on accumulated earnings. 3 On the other hand a "thick" corporation capitalized at $300,000 would have to have netted an income of $1,665,000 as compared to the
$400,000 required by the "thin" corporation to net its stockholders $250,000 inpocket after taxes and maintain its net worth at $300,000. The creditO and exclusion6 provisions for stock dividends hardly offsets these advantages obtained
by the issuance of debentures. The remainder of this paper shall concern itself
with the treatment which the tax collector and the courts give to "debt" financing
in closely held corporations, and what criteria these debt instruments must meet for
tax recognition purposes.
lII-NECEsSSARY ELEMENTS OF A DEBENTURE
Whether a business is incorporated under a tax free exchange 7 or under a
taxable exchange, it always seems desirous to obtain the advantages of issuing
1. The term "debt financing" refers to the financing of a corporation with
more debt than equity. "Thin incorporation" has the same meaning, but it seems
wise to avoid its use in some contexts, since it suggests a ressult rather than a
means. The result being that it is bad for tax purposes.
2. Schlesinger, Thin Incorporation: Income Tax Advantages and Pitfalls,

61 HARV. L. REv. 50 (1947).

INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §531.
4. The example is more fully explained in 61 HARV. L. REV. 50 (1947).

3.

5.

INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,

§34.

6. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §116.
7. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Section 351 allows a business to be
incorporated without recognition of taxable gain if certain criterion are met.
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debt instruments. But a small closely held corporation may find it difficult to
attract outside creditors, or may for economic or control reasons prefer not to be
indebted to outsiders. Then it must turn to its own shareholders. At this point
many queries arise: Will these debt instruments be recognized for tax purposes?
What will the tax collector be looking for when the corporate financial structure
is examined? What factors might lead to the nonrecognition of the debt intruments?
The answer to these questions lies in one word-"inten". The courts all
say that they determine the validity of debt instruments by the intention of the
parties; whether there was an intention to create a debtor-creditor relationship or
to make a capital contribution. By breaking down the decisions we find that this
intent is determined by one or a combination of three factors: (1) The form of
the instrument, (2) The ratio of the debt to the equity financing, (3) Whether
there is an intention to assume risks or to create a debt.

III-A. PROPER Fomi
The court always seems to look to the form of an instrument first, for if it
is not in form a bona fide indebtedness the court will conclude that a debt was
not intended and the .tax advantages will be disallowed. Indebtednesses lacking proper form are more commonly referred to as "hybrid" securities. They are issued
usually because of fear of dogging the corporation's credit position, hoping that
the instruments will pass as preferred stock before the creditors, and as a bond,
debenture, or note before the tax collector. The case of John Kelly Co. v. Commissioner8 is the leading case developing the use of the "hybrid" securities test.
This case suggested the following characteristic of hybrid securities: (1) They
are transferable only with stock, (2) They have far-off maturities or no maturity
dates, (3) The "interest" is geared to income or is discretionary with the directors,
(4) Payment of "interest" or "principal" or both, is subordinated to general creditors, and (5) They are issued only to stockholders and not for new consideration.
Other cases have endorsed these characteristics of a hybrid security and have
added others: (6) Repayment of the principal is uncertain or contingent, 9 (7)
Lack of a definite obligation to pay a fixed sum,' 0 (8) Lack of a method or the
right to enforce payment in event of default," (9) The name given the instru8. 326 U.S. 521 (1946).
9. Charles A. Polizzi, 16 T.C.M. 668 (1957); Wachmont v. Herdricksen, 137
F.2d 306 (9th Cir. 1943); Commissioner v. Page Oil Co., 129 F.2d 748 (2d Cir. 1942).
10. Charles A. Polizzi, note 9 supra; Staked Plains Trust v. Commissioner,
143 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1944).
11. Universal Oil Products Co. v. Campbell, 181 F.2d 451 (7th Cir. 1950);
Commissioner v. Schnoll Fils Association, 110 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1940).
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meat connotes a capital investment,12 (10) Presence of an implied or express
intent that payments are not to be indebtedness.' 3
If too many of these factors are found the instrument will be treated as preferred stock rather than as evidence of indebtedness. Some of these characteristics
are more decisive. The lack of a fixed maturity date or the lack of a definite obligation to pay the interest or principal are enough in themselves to convert an
indebtedness into stock.' 4 On the other hand interest has been held to be deductible on instruments labeled and referred to as stock where there has been
a fixed maturity date or redemption date.' 5 This further emphasizes the fact that
the substance of an instrument prevails over its form. Ii the case of Max Greenhouse v. Commissioner's the corporation there involved was financed entirely
by loans, but there was no issuance of any instruments, nor any arrangements for
the payment of interest or principal. The court dismissed taxpayer's argument that
losses from these losses were business bad debts, and held them to be capital losses,
treating the loans as contributions to capital. The court said that if the taxpayer
intended to make a loan he should have fixed a maturity date and established a
7
right to force payment in default.'
It seems quite clear that once an instrument comes under the scrutiny of the
court it must meet the strict standards of a bona fide instrument of indebtedness
or else be subject to being treated as a stock investment. The criteria used for
hybrid securities are the same in the tax courts and in the higher courts, and all
seem to apply these criteria with the same amount of strictness.
III-B.

UNEXCESSIUv

RATIO TO EQUITY

The second factor in measuring the validity of debt instruments is the amount
of the investor's holdings in debentures and in equities. Where the ratio of debt to
equity has been too high many cases have resulted in refusal to recognize the
indebtedness. Assuming that the corporation is so unconcerned about its credit
standing that it can issue debt securities containing iron-dad indicia of debt, the
court's problem is then whether the corporation is so undercapitalized so as to
regard holders of indebtedness as stockholders or potential stockholders. If the
court finds that advances are made to a newly formed corporation under the guise
12. Kingsmill Corp., 28 T.C. No. 33 (1957).
13. Pacific Southwest Ry. v. Commissioner, 128 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1942).
14. United States v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 133 F.2d 990 (6th Cir.
1943); A. R. Jones Syndicate v. Commissioner, 23 F.2d 833 (7th Cir. 1927);
Universal Oil Products Co. v. Campbell, note 11 supra; 241 Corp., N.Y., N.Y.,
15 T.C.M. 901 (1956).
15. Commissioner v. Palmer, Stacy-Merrill Inc., 111 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1940);
A. R. Jones Syndicate v. Commissioner, note 14 supra.
16. 13 T.C.M. 849 (1954).
17. See also, 241 Corp., N.Y., N.Y., note 14 supra.
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of debts where there is little or no paid-in capital, the advances will be treated as
capital investments or contributions in their entirety.' 8 The debt to equity ratio
of 4:1 has generally been accepted by most courts as indicative of the fact that the
corporation is not undercapitalized, 19 while a ratio in excess of 4:1 has been
indicative of undercapitalization. 20 This ratio may not be realistic in some businesses,2 1 e.g., corporations owning and operating real property--since creditors
might be less concerned about low equity as long as value of underlying assets safely
covers the amount of the creditors' loans. No case however has taken the vie*
that the ratio test is to be considered in the economic context of the particular
industry involved. This is probably because such a flexible use would present
many administrative problems.
Both the tax court and the higher courts seem to accept and use the 4:1
debt-equity ratio. But the rigidity of the ratio has been tempered by the courts'
accepting and using sound accounting concepts. In computing the equity investment such factors as unrealized appreciation, earned surplus, goodwill and other
intangible assets are taken into consideration.
In computing the equity investment, the fair market value of assets contributed, rather than their book value, is the significant factor 2 2 Most of the cases
so holding concerned the tax free incorporation, pursuant to Section 351, of an
already operating sole proprietorship or partnership.23 Under these circumstances,
assets in the hands of a transferee corporation take the basis of these assets in the
hands of the predecessor sole proprietorship or partnership. Nevertheless, where
such an exchange has been made, the courts, in determining the adequacy of
capitalization, will look to the book value rather than the fair market value of
assets in the hands of the corporate transferee. Even though the transfer of the
appreciated assets, on incorporation, is to a completely new and never before
functioning enterprise, it would appear that any demonstrable spread between the
economic value and the book value of the transferred assets likewise should be
24
included in computing the equity iivestment in the newly organized corporation.
Earned surplus, existing at the time of the issuance of notes or debentures is
18. Hilbert Bair, 16 T.C. 90 (1951), aff'd, 199 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1952); Erard
A. Matthussen, 16 T.C. 781 (1951), aff'd, 194 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1952); Joseph B.
Thomas, 2 T.C. 193 (1943).
19. Isidor Dobkin, 15 T.C. 31 (1950), aff'd, 192 F.2d 392 (2 Cir. 1951); Ainslie
Perrault, 25 T.C. 439 (1955); Warren Brown, 27 T.C. 27 (1956).
20. Isidor Dobkin, note 19 supra; 241 Corp., N.Y., N.Y., note 14 supra.
21. Isidor Dobkin, note 19 supra; Kipsborough Realty Corp., 10 T.C.M. 932
(1951); Bacon Inc., 4 T.C. 1107 (1945).
22. Kraft:Foods Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1956); Ainslie
Perrault, note 19 supra.
23. Sheldon Tauber, 24 T.C. 179 (1955); Cleveland Adolph Mayer Realty
Corp., 6 T.C. 730 (1946).
24. United States v. W. J. Jones & Sons, Inc., 200 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1952).
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similarly to be included in computing the equity side of the ratio.25 As surplus
accounts will be part of a corporation's underlying assets, to which creditors will
look for satisfaction of their claims, this approach is sound from an accounting
and economic standpoint.
Goodwill may be defined as the value attached to a business over and above
the value attributed to the other stated assets. The basic element of goodwill is
the probability that customers of a business will continue to patronize it. While,
in general, only purchased goodwill is recognized by accountants for balancesheet purposes, the existence of goodwill would be of significance to a lender.
In several cases involving the adequacy of capitalization, existing goodwill, or
going-concern value has been at least a make-weight in holding a corporation
not to be thinly incorporated. 26
The value of franchises, licenses, and similar intangibles are also to be included
in the determination of capital 27 To a lender relying on underlying assets, these
are assets of consequence.
Thus, in the application of the ratio test, the cases, at least in these four
areas have indicated an awareness of business and accounting realities.
Usually an excessive debt-equity ratio in addition to other equity indicia
causes the court to hold a debt instrument to be equity, e.g., "hybrid" features,28
intent to assume equity risks.2 9 But debt instruments which have otherwise ironclad indicia of debt have on occasion been held to be equity on the sole basis that
the debt-equity ratio was excessive 30 This use of the excessive debt-equity ratio
as the sole criteria to determine the intent of the parties has been subject to recent criticism. Rowan v. United States31 proclaims that if there is no manifestation of intent to create an equity rather than a debt other than the debt-equity
ratio then a debt instrument should not be changed to capital. The court said in
part . . ."It would obviously work an unwarranted interference by the courts
in ordinary and perfectly proper business procedures for us to say that there
can be established as a matter of hindsight, a ratio of stockholder owned debt
25. B. M. C. Manufacturing Corp., 11 T.C.M. 376 (1952); New England Lime
Co., 13 T.C. 799 (1949), acq.
26. Bakhaus & Burke, Inc., 14 T.C.M. 919 (1955); Ruspyn Corp., 18 T.C. 769
(1952), acq.
27. John W. Walker, Inc., 23 T.C. 550 (1954).
28. 241 Corp., N.Y., N.Y., note 14 supra; Powers Photo Engraving Co. v.
Commissioner, 197 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1952); Colony Inc. 26 T.C. 30 (1956); Charles
A. Polizzi, note 9 supra.
29. Emanuel Kolkery, 27 T.C. 37 (1956); United States v. W. J. Jones & Sons,
Inc., note 24 supra.
30. Isidor Dobkin, note 19 supra; Sun Properties v. United States, 220 F.2d
171 (5th Cir. 1955).
31. 219 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1955).
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the capital of the debtor corporation. ... Stockholders should be free to commit
corporations such capital as they choose and to lend such additional amounts
they may elect if that is their true intent. ...It is for Congress not the courts
establish a ratio if it is deemed necessary within the scheme of taxation."

This view was also suggested by the earlier cases of Sam Schnizer v.
Commissioner3 2 and Gussow, Kahn & Co. Inc. v. Commissioner.33 The Rowan
case though disapproving the debt-equity ratio as a manifestation of intent
did indicate what factors would determine that a debt instrument was
really an equity. These factors encompass the accepted "hybrid" criteria,
and add another criterion: If evidences of indebtedness were exchanged for
assets or money necessary to commence the corporate life they will not be
recognized as debt. The Rowan case, if followed, would not cause a great change
in the intent criteria, since there are only a few cases that use the debt-equity
ratio as the sole criterion in determining whether a debt or an equity was
intended.34 However the Rowan case could relax the 4:1 debt-equity ratio
requirement. Corporate financial structures which have a debt-equity ratio in
excess of 4:1 would be acceptable as long as the other factors indicative of equity
are not present. Such an approach would thus answer the objection that the 4:1
ratio is not realistic because it does not take into consideration the economic
coniext of the particular business involyed. Under the Rowan approach the
economic context could be taken into consideration.
III--c INTENT TO CREATE A DEBT

The third factor in determiuing the intent of the parties is whether or not
the holders of the debt instruments meant to assume the risks of the business
rather than to create a debt. (Although this phrase may also be descriptive of
the former two factors, it is meant to encompass only that area where the debt
instruments are not objectionable because of form or because of the debt-equity
ratio.) Under this heading the courts look for two criteria: (1) Whether the
stockholders' interests are identical with their interests as creditors. (2) Whether
the debt instruments were issued to stockholders in exchange for assets required to
get the business underway.
(1) Identity of interests: The cases holding that indebtedness is to be
considered equity in a closely held corporation where the advances are made in
substantially the same proportion as the stockholdings, usually use that factor in
corroboration with an excessive debt-equity ratio.3 5 The case of Gooding Amuse32.
33.
34.
35.

13 T.C. 43 (1949).
13 T.C. 580 (1949); 5 TAX LAw REV. 424 (1950).
Note 30, supra.
New England Lime Co., 13 T.C. 799 (1949), acq.; United States v. W. J.

Jones & Sons, Inc., note 24 supra.
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ment Co. Inc. v. Commissioner0" in effect seems to hold that the receipt of stock
and debentures in the same proportion by the incorporators as the interests
transferred by them to the corporation is alone sufficient reason for the court to
convert the debentures into capital, In this case a family partnership, consisting of
three members, incorporated the partnership business. The incorporation was
effected outside of the provisions of Section 351, and therefore was a taxable
exchange. The assets of the partnership were sold to the corporation in exchange
for no par common stock and interest bearing notes. The partners received stock
and notes in the same proportion as their respective partnership interests. The
notes were ordinary negotiable notes having none of the fatal indicia of hybrid
securities, nor was there an excessive debt-equity ratio. But the court held that
the notes were the same as stock, and therefore the interest payments were not
deductible by the corporation and the principal repayments were taxable dividends to the stockholders. The court also held the original incorporation was tax
free, and therefore the basis of the assets in the hands of the corporation was the
same as in the hands of the partners. This result denied the corporation a sizable
depreciation on those assets.
The decision was based upon the following reasons: First, the court stated"The most significant aspect of the instant case is the complete identity of
inierest between and among the three noteholders, coupled with their control of
the corporation... It is, in our opinion, unreasonable to ascribe to the petitioner
an intent at the time of the issuance of the notes ever to enforce payment of his
notes, especially if to do so would impair the credit rating of the corporation,
cause it to borrow from other sources the funds necessary to meet the payments,
or bring about its dissolution." Second, the court stated that as corroboration of
its finding, the majority of the notes had long since reached maturity and had not
been paid. 'But if we bear in mind that this is only corroboration of the basic
premise that there was no intent to enforce the notes, then even without these
corroborating facts the court could have come to the same conclusion. Thirdly,
the court added that although there is nothing wrong with a transaction designed
to produce the least tax, tax avoidance will not be ermitted if the transaction
on which such avoidance rests is a sham or lacks genuineness. In support of this
the court offered the statement that "substance shall prevail over form"; but this
statement is a conclusion to be based on legal rationale, and does not establish very
much basis from which to draw a conclusion.
It has been suggested that under the court's reasoning it would be virtually
impossible for any dosed corporation to issue bonds or notes to its shareholders
whether at the time of incorporation or subsequent to its incorporation. Also that
the effect of such reasoning will upset the established theory of limitation of
36.

23 T.C. 408 (1954), aff1', 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956).
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liability as being one of the prime considerations influencing individuals to
37
incorporate.
If the Gooding decision is followed then in spite of the presence of bona
fide debts which do not violate the debt-equity ratio the courts may still strike
down debentures and treat them as equity. The court need only find a complete
identity of interests. On the other hand the Gooding case could be limited to its
facts. It should be noted that the corporation consisted of a closed family
corporation, and that the court held that there was not valid business purpose or
reason for the transaction. In the cases of Estate of H. B. Miller v. Commissioner s
and Warren Brown v. Commissioner39 similar fact situations were prses-.'"
partnerships transferring assets to a corporation in exchange for stock and not'es;....
and the stocks and notes being held in substantially the same proportion as the
interests transferred. The court in those cases did not consider the identity of
interests and upheld the notes as valid indebtedness in both cases. It is noted that
the corporations in these latter two cases, though closely held, were not closed
family corporations, and that the court in each case made a point of showing that
there was a valid business purpose behind the exchange of assets for notes.
However the business purposes in these cases are not so distinctive from those in
the Gooding case so as to be the decisive factor. In the case of Kraft Foods Co.
v. Commissioner40 the Court of Appeals reversed the tax court's finding that
notes were capital because there was no valid business purpose. The court said if
the transactions are real they cannot be characterized as sham merely because they
were entered into for the purpose of reducing taxes.
One might conclude that the court is more suspicious of closed family
corporations than of closely held non-family corporations, and that it is easier
to find complete identity of interest to strike down debentures in a family
corporation than in a non-family corporation. Even if the court is correct in its
suspicions, suspicion is hardly an adequate measuring stick of intention.
(2) The purpose behind issuing debentures: Until recently it was ordinarily assumed that if a new corporation issued bonds and stock to its organizers
in exchange for business assets, the debentures (if valid on their face and not
excessive in amount) would be recognized as such even though they were issued
for fixed assets or other property necessary to conduct the business. The situation
usually arises when a going business incorporates and sells its assets to the corporation in exchange for negotiable notes. The purpose of this is to lay the basis
for interest deductions by the corporation as well as for withdrawals of corporate
37. A very good presentation and analysis of the Gooding case appears in:
Robin, The Clifford Case of the Thin Corporation,34 TAXES 282 (1956).
38. 239 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1956).
39. 27 T.C. 27 (1956).
40. 232 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1956).
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profits in the form of payments on the purchase price of the assets. If the stock
and notes had been issued in exchange for assets in a Section 351 transaction,
the notes would probably be treated as the equivalent of stock, causing the interest
deductions to be disallowed and payments of the notes to be taxed as a dividend.
In addition to avoiding the perils of the thin corporation, the sale is designed to
give the corporation a basis for the transferred assets equal to their fair market
value. However these advantages will be lost if the notes are treated as the equivalent of stock. This could occur if the court finds the sale took place in concurrence
with the incorporation so as to be a single transaction falling under Section 351.41
If the transaction becomes a Section 351 exchange the notes could be treated as
"boot" or as "securities" equivalent to stock. Or the court could easily find the
42
notes to be stock if the sale gave the corporation an excessive debt-equity ratio.
But there still remains the question of the validity of the notes if the sale is
made to a corporation that has an adequate debt-equity ratio.
The tax court recently raised the very question of whether evidences of
indebtedness are to be considered as not bona fide merely because they are issued
to the corporation's shareholders in exchange for assets required to get the business
under way. In Emanuel Kolkery v. Commissioner43 the court concluded that since
the shareholders supplied everything the corporation needed to carry on the
business in exchange for notes, that they intended to take the risks of the corporate
adventure, and therefore the n6tes were the equivalent of stock. The court also
found support for their conclusion by holding there was not valid a business purpose
for the transaction. In Estate of H. B. Miller v. Commissioner" the tax court
reached a similar result on the grounds that the partnership there involved
transferred assets necessary to get the business under way to the corporation in
exchange for stock and notes. Here also the tax court found support for its
decision by holding that there was a lack of business purpose other than tax
avoidance. In Janeway, v. Commissioner" the court held notes issued in an
exchange of assets, to. be stock on the grounds that the notes were exchange for
advances constituting' the corporation's sole source of working capital This
conclusion was supported.by the fact that the stock and notes were issued in the
same proportion. In B'achrach v. Commissioner4 6 the court reached a similar
result for similar reasons, but in that case the court had further support in the
fact that notes were not issued for the loans.
On the other hand the court in Warren Brown v. Commissioner47 held notes
issued in exchange for assets required by the corporation to operate to be -valid.
41. R. M. Gunn, 25 T.C. 424 (1955).

42. Sun Properties v. United States, note 30 supra.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

27 T.C. 37 (1956).
24 T.C. 923 (1955).
2 T.C. 197 (1943), aff'd, 147 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1945).
18 T.C. 479 (1952), aff'd, 205 F.2d 151 (2d Cir. 1953).
27 T.C. 27 (1956).
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Here -the court based its holding on the fact that there was a valid and sound
business purpose behind the transaction. The Miller case, on appeal, was reversed
on the grounds that there was a valid business purpose for the transaction, so that
48
the transaction was not a sham and the notes were valid indebtedness.
It seems clear that the tax court looks with disfavor on indebtedness issued
by a closely held corporation to its shareholders in exchange for assets required to
get the business under way. If the court can point to other disfavorable factors49
it will convert the indebtedness into capital. If there are no other disfavorable
fuaois present then the court looks to the purpose behind the transaction. If there
is a valid business purpose, which is not a sham or a tax avoidance, the courts will
recognize the indebtedness.50
IV-PARENT-SUBSIDIARY RELATIONSHIPS

All of the factors referred to above, used by the courts to determine whether
there was intended a debt or an equity, apply equally as well to the parentsubsidiary corporation relationship. In National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner"1
the court held that loans made by a parent to a subsidiary were in fact contributions to capital because the parent had supplied all the funds and assets required
by the sudsidiary to operate. In Eli E. Dorsey v. Commissioner 2 loans were held
to be contributions to capital because of an excessive debt-equity ratio. In Kraft
Foods Co. v. Commissioner5 3 the court analyzed the debentures in question in the
same manner as if the parent was an individual stockholder. The court made a
special point of stating that a debt should not be disregarded merely because of
a parent-subsidiary relationship.
V--DEvIcEs SuGGEsTED T9 AVOID DEBT FINANCING PROBLEMS

Two noteworthy devices have been suggested to avoid the problems of debt
financing. The first suggests the purchase by stockholders in their individual
capacity of 'assets necessary for corporate operations, with the stockholders then
loaning these assets to the corporation instead of creating a corporate indebtedness
to purchase the property. 54. This device seems rather complicated to be used solely
for tax reasons. Also an extensive use of it might give rise to a questioning of the
corporate form, and whether or not the corporation is merely an empty shell.
48. 239 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1956).
49. Notes 45, 46, supra.

50. Notes 43, 47, 48, supra.

51. 336 U.S. 422 (1949).
52. 15 T.C.M. 1101 (1956).
53. 232 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1956).
54. The Thin Capitalization Problem Can be Beat, J. TAXATION, May 1955.
p. 286.
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The second device suggested is that the corporation borrow from outside
sources like banks, with stockholders guaranteeing the loans.55 The purpose of
this device would be to attempt to convert loss, on loans to corporations, from
non-business bad debts (short term capital loss) into ordinary loss in a transaction
entered into for profit (deductible in full in the year of loss). However, the
advantages of this device seems to have been minimized by the recent decision in
Putnam v. Commissioner.5" The Putnam case has disapproved three of the cases
on which the proponent of the device relied to support his contention that
payments made by stockholders on guarantees are deductible as "incurred in a
transaction entered into for profit."57 In the Putnam case an attorney guaranteed
loans to a corporation with whih he was wholly unconnected. The Supreme Court
held that payments he was required to make on the guarantees, after the corporation became insolvent, were only deductible as non-business bad debts and not as
losses from a transaction entered into for profit. In its decision the Court
disapproved the cases where the shareholder was allowed a loss from a transaction
entered into for profit resulting from payments required to be made on a
guarantee.58 An even more drastic result could occur if the courts treated a
guaranteed loan as a loan to the shareholder who passed it on to the corporation
as a contribution to capital. E. J. Ellisberg v. Commissioner 9 though not directly
in point held a guaranteed loan not to be such, but rather a gift from the guarantor
to the borrower. This suggests that the court might treat guaranteed loans to a
corporation as contributions to capital, and then the payments from the corporation
would be treated as a dividend to the guarantor, and he, rather than the corporation, would have an interest deduction. If the debt-equity ratio of the
corporation was excessive it would seem doubtful that a guaranteed loan would
be held bona fide when a direct loan would not.
VI-CONCLUSON

It is well to remember that the court's primary consideration when confronted
with a debt instrument of a closely held corporation is whether there was an
intention to create a debtor-creditor relationship or to make a capital investment
or contribution. This intention is to be gleaned from the entire transaction and
its surrounding circumstaices; 60 the form of the instrument, the ratio of debt t6
equity, the proportion in which the stock and debt are held, when the debt was
issued, whether it was received in exchange for assets required to operate the
corporation, and the purpose of the transaction.
55. Capital Formation of Speculative Enterprises, 34 TAXES 420 (1956).
56. 352 U.S. 82 (1956).
57. Fox v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 101 (2d Cir. 1954); Pollak v. Commis.
sioner, 209 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1954); Edwards v. Allen, 216 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1954).
58. Edwards v. Allen, note 57 supra. A complete discussion of the Putnam
case and its effect on tax law can be found in: Brown, Putnamv. CommissionerThe Reimbursable Outlay Under the Tax Law, 6 BUFFALo L. RaV. 283 (1957).
59. 9 T.C. 463 (1947).
60. Charles A. Polizzi, note 9 supra.
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
The most important of these factors seems to be the form of the instrument.
The other factors do not seem to be applied as strictly as the "hybrid" factors;
they do not seem to be as well settled or applied as uniformly. The identity-ofinterest test has been watered down by the fact that two cases, since the Gooding
case have recognized debt despite an identity of interest."' The American Law
Institute6 2 indicates its conviction that the identity of ownership of stock and debt
holdings should not be a relevant factor in determining the validity of loans by
stockholders. The debt-equity ratio though relied on heavily in the past seems to
be on the way out as a sole criterion for determining intent. If the Rowan6" case
is followed, an excessive debt-equity ratio alone will be insufficient to cause a debt
to be treated as the equivalent of equity. The American Law Institute64 suggests
that there should be no upper limit upon the permissible ratio of pro rata debt to
equity where substantial amounts of capital have been invested in the corporation.
When the court holds an instrument not to be a bona fide debt the entire
issue of the instruments usually falls. A common question is what becomes of
these instruments once they are held not to be bona fide debts? If the court
characterizes the instruments as preferred stock, then the owners would be well
advised to sell them, since a sale may avoid the dividend tax that would be
imposed if they were held until retirement. A sale of the instruments would
produce capital gain to the shareholder with their basis being determined under
Section 358. The "interese paid by the corporation to the new owners would
continue to be non-deductible, but they would be entitled to a dividend-received
credit. The retirement of the instruments would be treated as a redemption of
stock under Section 302, and it would probably produce capital gain or loss
under Section 302(b) (1) or 302(b) (3). Loans by shareholders are sometimes
labeled "contributions to .capital," the implications being that the instruments are
to be totally disregarded. Pursuing this rationale, the entire proceeds from a sale
of the instruments by the shareholder would be taxable, since there would be no
offsetting basis, and the proceeds would be ordinary income rather than capital
gain, since the "instruments" would not be properly within the meaning of the
capital asset definition of Section 1221. The instrument might presumably come
to life in the hands of the transferees, but whether they would be characterized
as shares of preferred stock or authentic evidences of indebtedness is unclear.
They might be characterized as evidences of indebtedness so far as the new
owners are concerned but the corporation may be denied the interest deduction. 65
By now it should be clear that the questions and problems in the tax area of
61. IKraft Foods Co. v. Commissioner, note 22 supra; Rowan v. United
States, 219 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1955).
62. ALI FED. INcomE TAx STAT. Vol. II (Feb. 1954 Draft).

63. 219 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1955).
64. See note 62 supra.
65. These questions and others are raised and attempted to be answered in:
Thin Capitalization:Some Current Questions, 34 TAXEs 830 (1956).
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corporate debt-equity financing are, numerous and complex. The practitioner
might well be advised to take each problem presented to him separately and
compare it with all the related cases of the same type before making a decision.
This is hardly an area where application of generalized principles will suffice in
every case.
Jack L. Getman

